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Recent Developments [VOL.23
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT - STANDING To
CHALLENGE AGENCY ACTION REQUIRES A SHOWING THAT THE
PLAINTIFF HAS SUFFERED INJURY IN FACT TO A PROTECTED INTEREST
FROM THE FACE OF THE PARTICULAR STATUTORY PROVISION ALLEGEDLY
VIOLATED, OR WHEN PROTECTIVE INTENT Is CLEAR FROM ITS
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY.
Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Blumenthal (D.C. Cir. 1977)
Tax Analysts and Advocates (TAA), a nonprofit corporation organized
to promote tax reform,' and Thomas F. Field, executive director of TAA,
sought a declaratory judgment2 that certain published and private rulings of
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)3 allowing tax credits for payments made
to foreign nations by domestic corporations operating abroad in the area of
oil extraction and production were contrary to section 901 of the Internal
Revenue Code (Code)' and therefore unlawful.5 Both TAA, as the representa-
1. Tax Analysts and Advocates, at the time of this action, represented over 175
individual financial supporters. Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Simon, 390 F. Supp.
927, 929 (D.D.C. 1975). A stated purpose of the organization was to ensure that the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) properly applied the Internal Revenue Code (Code)
and did not grant favorable tax treatment to special interest groups beyond that
which the IRS could lawfully provide. Id. at 929.
2. Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 130, 134 (D.C. Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3527 (Feb. 21, 1978). The plaintiffs also sought a permanent
injunction requiring the IRS to withdraw the rulings and collect taxes from the oil
companies for all periods not barred by the statute of limitations where foreign credits
were taken pursuant to the rulings. Id. at 134.
The defendants in the instant case were the Secretary of the Treasury and the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Commissioner), who were sued in their official
capacities. Id. at 134 n.7.
3. Rev. Rul. 68-552, 1968-2 C.B. 306-07; Rev. Rul. 55-296, 1955-1 C.B. 386.
4. I.R.C. § 901(a), (b) (amended 1976). Section 901 provides in pertinent part:(a) Allowance of credit - If the taxpayer chooses to have the benefits of
this subpart, the tax imposed by this chapter shall ...be credited with the
amounts provided in the applicable paragraph of subsection (b) ....
(b) Amount allowed - [T]he following amounts shall be allowed as the
credit under subsection (a):
(1) Citizens and domestic corporations - In the case of a . . .domestic
corporation, the amount of any income, war profits, and excess profits taxes.
paid or accrued during the taxable year to any foreign country ....
Id. Section 901 allows qualified domestic corporations to claim a tax credit for income
taxes paid or accrued during the taxable year to any foreign country. Id. No credit is
allowed for the payment of mineral royalties, excise taxes, severance taxes, or similar
payments to foreign governments. Id. Plaintiffs contended that the payments made
by the American companies to foreign nations were not creditable taxes within the
meaning of § 901(b). 566 F.2d at 135. The complaint alleged that the payments were
calculated on a fixed per barrel basis and, although denominated as income taxes,
they were actually royalties paid for the right to extract oil from the land or excise,
severance, or similar noncreditable taxes. 390 F. Supp. at 930. Excise taxes, severance
taxes, and royalty payments are ordinary business expenses which may be deducted
from gross income, but which cannot be used to offset tax liability. 566 F.2d at 135.
See generally I.R.C. § 162 (amended 1976). Plaintiffs averred that the loss to the
United States Treasury as a result of this distinction was three billion dollars in 1974.
566 F.2d at 134 n.10.
5. 566 F.2d at 134. The action was based on § 10 of the Administrative Procedure
Act, which provided: "A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or
(580)
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tive of its membership, and Field, as an individual taxpayer, claimed to
have standing to sue as federal taxpayers. 6 Field further contended that he
had standing as a competitor, based on his status as the owner of the entire
working interest in a domestic oil well.7 The district court dismissed the
complaint, having determined that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring
the action.8 The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
affirmed, holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue as federal
taxpayers because they had suffered no judicially cognizable injury in that
capacity.9 The court further concluded that Field lacked standing to sue in
his capacity as the owner of a domestic oil well because, while suffering
economic injury as a competitor engaged in oil extraction and production, he
failed to assert an interest that fell within the "zone of interests" protected
by the relevant provisions of the Code.10 Tax Analysts & Advocates v.
Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 130 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
The doctrine of standing to sue is derived from limitations imposed on
federal courts by the "case or controversy" requirement of article III of the
adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant
statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof." Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L.
No. 89-554, ch. 7, § 702, 80 Stat. 378 (1966) (current version at 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976)).
See note 25 infra.
6. 566 F.2d at 134. Plaintiffs claimed a "personal pecuniary interest in requiring
that the IRS assess and collect taxes owed by other taxpayers to the fullest possible
extent under the provisions of the Code." Id. at 134 n.10. Field and TAA alleged that
this interest had been injured by the higher federal income tax burden they had to
assume as a result of the defendants' failure to tax this foreign oil production income.
Id.
7. Id. at 134 & n.6. Field's oil well was located in Venango County,
Pennsylvania. 390 F. Supp. at 929. According to the purchase agreement, Field paid
the owner of the land on which the well was located a fixed royalty payment for the
right to extract the oil. Id. These payments were deductible from Field's gross income
but could not be credited against his tax liability. Id. at 931. Field contended that he
competed in the domestic oil market with those companies which had been granted
favorable tax treatment by the Commissioner. Id. at 929. As a competitor, Field
claimed that the Code granted him a "protected interest in competitive fairness and
equity in matters of federal taxation" which had been injured by the IRS rulings. 566
F.2d at 136. Specifically, he alleged that the rulings resulted in his loss of potential
income from the sale of domestically produced oil. Id. at 136-37. Since prices charged
by international companies largely determined the domestic market price for crude
oil, the favorable tax treatment afforded these companies enabled them to sell their
foreign oil at lower prices in the United States. Id. As a result of these rulings, Field
also asserted that the value of foreign oil investments were increased since they
yielded higher returns, while the value of similar domestic investments were
decreased. Id.
8. 390 F. Supp. at 932, 942. The district court found that the plaintiffs lacked
standing as federal taxpayers since theirs was a generalized grievance common to the
taxpaying public. Id. at 932-33. The lower court also concluded that plaintiff Field
failed to establish that he had been injured economically as a result of the rulings
since the market price of oil produced at his well had increased steadily over the
years. Id. at 942. Finally, the court determined that Field had failed to assert an
interest that fell within the "zone of interests" protected by the relevant provisions of
the Code. Id. See note 50 infra.
9. 566 F.2d at 134. The D.C. Circuit adopted the reasoning of the district court as
to the disposition of the issue of federal taxpayer standing. Id. at 134 & n.10. See note
47 infra.
10. 566 F.2d at 134-35.
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Constitution," and by rules of self-restraint adopted by the judiciary as
prudential limitations on the exercise of federal power.12 The minimum
constitutional requirement that the litigant allege "such a personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues,"'13 coupled with judicial policy
limitations, effectively operates to bar the use of the federal courts as a
forum for the airing of generalized grievances about the conduct of the
government. 14
Flast v. Cohen15 marked a departure from the long standing bar to
taxpayer suits challenging the constitutionality of federal taxing and
spending programs. 6 In Flast, the plaintiffs asserted an injury to their
11. U.S. CONsT. art. III,§ 2.
12. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). In Warth, the Court stated: "In
essence the question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court
decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues. The inquiry involves both
constitutional limitations on federal court jurisdiction and prudential limitations on
its exercise." Id. at 498. It is generally agreed that actual or threatened injury to an
interest of the plaintiff is required to satisfy article III limitations. Id. at 499.
However, prudential limitations are not constitutional requirements but rather
restrictions imposed by the Supreme Court in its supervisory power over the federal
judiciary. Id. at 499-501; 566 F.2d at 137.
The courts, however, often fail to distinguish adequately between minimum
constitutional requirements and standing limitations based on rules of judicial self-
restraint. See Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. CHi. L. REV. 450, 468-70
(1970); Comment, Federal Standing: 1976, 4 HOFSTRA L. REV. 383, 384, 414 (1976)
(hereinafter cited as Federal Standing]. Prudential limitations operate to bar a
plaintiff from asserting a "generalized grievance" against governmental conduct.
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 499. However, in Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop
the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974), the Court held:
[S]tanding to sue may not be predicated upon an interest of the kind alleged here
which is held in common by all members of the public, because of the necessarily
abstract nature of the injury all citizens share. Concrete injury, whether actual or
threatened, is that indispensable element of a dispute which serves in part to
cast it in a form traditionally capable of judicial resolution.
Id. at 220-21. The Court concluded that abstract injury did not satisfy the minimum
constitutional requirements of article III. Id. at 218-19. Thus, in Schlesinger, denial of
standing to plaintiffs asserting "generalized grievances" was framed in terms of
constitutional limitations, and not as a rule of judicial self-restraint as in Warth. Id.;
see 422 U.S. at 499-500.
Although Congress may remove prudential limitations by statute, the
plaintiff must still meet the article III requirement of an injury in fact. 422 U.S. at 501.
While Congress cannot confer standing in violation of this constitutional limitation, it
can create legal rights not existing without the statute. Id. at 501-02. If the
congressional intent to do so is clear, the invasion of these statutorily created legal
rights may confer standing. Id. Thus, Congress may affirmatively act to increase
judicially cognizable injuries. See Comment, Recent Standing Cases and a Possible
Alternative Approach, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 213, 215 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Alternative Approach].
13. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968), quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204
(1962).
14. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975). See generally Schlesinger v.
Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); United States v. Richardson,
418 U.S. 166 (1974).
15. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
16. See Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). In Frothingham, a taxpayer
challenged the constitutionality of the Maternity Act of 1921, ch. 135, 42 Stat. 224,
which authorized federal appropriations to reduce infant and maternal mortality. 262
[VOL. 23
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interests as taxpayers to challenge the constitutionality of a statute 7
authorizing the allocation of federal funds to support educational programs
in parochial schools.' 8 In deciding the standing issue, the Court formulated
a two-part "nexus test,"'19 which required consideration of the substantive
issues to determine whether there was a logical nexus between the status
asserted by the plaintiff and the claim sought to be adjudicated. 20 The first
requirement of the test was that the plaintiff challenge a statute which had
been enacted pursuant to the taxing and spending clause of the Constitu-
tion.21 Secondly, it was necessary to allege a violation of a specific
constitutional limitation on congressional taxing and spending power.
22
Since the Court determined that the establishment and free exercise clause
of the first amendment 23 operated as a specific limitation on Congress'
taxing and spending authority, the nexus test was satisfied and the plaintiff
was found to have the necessary personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy to establish standing.24
U.S. at 479. Mrs. Frothingham alleged that the Maternity Act was unconstitutional as
it infringed on powers reserved to the states by the tenth amendment. Id. at 479-80. In
addition, she asserted that the statute deprived her of property without due process of
law by unlawfully increasing her federal tax burden. Id. In a unanimous opinion
written by Justice Sutherland, the Court denied standing and held that Mrs.
Frothingham had not suffered a direct injury, actual or threatened, as a result of the
Maternity Act. Id. at 488. While recognizing that the Court had previously determined
that local taxpayers had standing to bring suit against municipalities to enjoin
alleged unlawful expenditures, the Court concluded that Mrs. Frothingham's
insignificant share in a "remote, fluctuating and uncertain" federal tax burden did
not provide the concrete injury necessary for standing. Id. at 486-88 (citations
omitted). As stated by the Court: "The administration of any statute, likely to produce
additional taxation to be imposed on a vast number of taxpayers, the extent of whose
several liability is indefinite and constantly changing, is essentially a matter of
public and not of individual concern." Id. at 487.
17. Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, tit. I & II, Pub. L. No.
89-110, 79 Stat. 27 (codified in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
18. 392 U.S. at 85.
19. Id. at 102. The Flast Court stated that in order to establish standing, a
taxpayer must "establish a logical link between [his] status and the type of legislative
enactment attacked .... [Tihe taxpayer must establish a nexus between that status
and the precise nature of the constitutional infringement alleged." Id. Therefore,
taxpayer suits were limited to challenges to statutes enacted under the taxing and
spending clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166,
175 (1974).
The Court in Flast never distinguished those constitutional provisions which
are specific limitations on the taxing and spending power from those which are not.
392 U.S. at 105. See Comment, Taxpayer Standing to Litigate, 61 Gao. L.J. 747, 764
(1973). However, the Court distinguished Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923),
by noting that the fifth and tenth amendments, which formed the basis of Mrs.
Frothingham's challenge, failed to qualify as specific limitations on the taxing and
spending power of Congress. 392 U.S. at 105. Thus, in Frothingham, the second part
of the nexus test would not have been satisfied. Id.
20. 392 U.S. at 102-03.
21. Id. at 102, citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
22. 392 U.S. at 102-03.
23. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
24. 392 U.S. at 105-06.
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In 1970, a test for determining standing for claims based on challenges
to agency action under section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA)25 was formulated by the Court. 26 In Association of Data Processing
Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp,27 private companies engaged in the
sale of computer services challenged rulings by the Comptroller of the
Currency which allowed national banks to provide data processing services
to their customers. 28 The plaintiffs contended that the resulting increased
competition in the computer service industry would result in a loss of future
customers and profits.29 The Court developed a two-part test for establishing
standing which required: 1) an allegation of injury in fact to the plaintiff;
and 2) that the interest sought to be protected by the plaintiff is arguably
within the "zone of interests" to be protected or regulated by the statute in
question. 3° The Court stated that economic injury resulting from increased
competition satisfied the first requirement of injury in fact.31 In addition, the
25. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 89-554, ch. 7, § 702, 80 Stat. 378
(1966) (current version at 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976)). Section 10 of the APA provided: "A
person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or
aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to
judicial review thereof." Id.
In order to have a claim based on § 10, a plaintiff must allege that official
agency action caused injury to an interest falling within the scope of protection of a
federal statute. See Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court - A Functional Analysis,
86 HARV. L. REV. 645, 668 (1973). A "statutory standing" case, by comparison,
involves a statute which not only creates a "protected interest," but also expressly
provides for judicial review for those claiming an injury to that interest. See
Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972). See generally Federal
Standing, supra note 12; Note, Jurisdiction to Review Federal Administrative Action:
District Court or Court of Appeals, 88 HARV. L. REV. 980 (1975).
26. See Association of Data Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150
(1970); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970). Justice Douglas, writing for the Court in
Data Processing, observed: "Flast was a taxpayer's suit. The present is a competitor's
suit. And while the two have the same Article III starting point, they do not
necessarily track one another." 397 U.S. at 152 (emphasis in original).
27. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
28. Id. at 151.
29. Id. at 152.
30. Id. at 152-53. The "zone of interests" test reflects the Court's effort to limit
judicial review of agency action through a self-imposed rule of restraint. See note 12
supra. For a discussion of the difficulties in applying the zone test, see Davis, supra
note 12, at 472; Comment, Judicial Review of Agency Action: The Unsettled Law of
Standing, 69 MIcH. L. REV. 540, 555-60 (1971).
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice White, concurred in the results of Data
Processing and Barlow, but would have held that injury in fact was the only
requirement for standing. Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 168, 169 (1970) (Brennan, J.,
concurring and dissenting). Justice Brennan noted that the "zone of interests" test
involves an inquiry into the merits of a case which distorts the analytical basis of the
standing doctrine. Id. at 168-70 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting). In his view,
a determination of congressional intent to protect the interests of the plaintiff falls
within the ambit of the law of reviewability, a concept distinct from the law of
standing. Id. at 169 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting) (emphasis in original).
Justice Brennan indicated that his test for reviewability would be a flexible
one: only "slight indicia that the plaintiffs class is a beneficiary" of the statute would
be necessary, and the fact that the plaintiff would be the only party likely to challenge
the action would be considered by the Court. Id. at 174-75 (Brennan, J., concurring
and dissenting).
31. 397 U.S. at 152.
[VOL. 23
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plaintiffs competitive interests were arguably within the zone of interests to
be protected by the Bank Service Corporation Act 32 and the National Bank
Act,33 which were determined to be "relevant" statutes within the meaning
of section 10 of the APA.34
In subsequent standing cases, application of the Data Processing test
resulted in a significant expansion of the categories of judicially cognizable
injuries sufficient to confer standing.35 However, the Supreme Court
abruptly reversed 36 this apparent liberalization of the standing doctrine.37 In
32. 12 U.S.C. § 1864 (1976). The Bank Service Corporation Act provides: "No bank
service corporation may engage in any activity other than the performance of bank
services for banks." Id.
33. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1976).
34. 397 U.S. at 157. The plaintiffs alleged that the Comptroller's ruling violated
that part of the National Bank Act which gives national banks only "such incidental
powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking." Id. at 157 & n.2. In
its analysis, however, the Court also reviewed § 4 of the Bank Service Corporation
Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1864 (1976), to establish the necessary protective intent. 397 U.S. at
156-57. The Court dismissed the defendant's argument that § 4 was irrelevant since it
applied to bank service corporations, not national banks, by noting that the
legislative history of § 4 indicated a fear that banks in general would engage in
nonbanking activity. Id. at 155-56. Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, concluded:
"The Acts do not in terms protect a specified group. But their general policy is
apparent; and those whose interests are directly affected by a broad or narrow
interpretation of the Acts are easily identifiable." Id. at 157.
In Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970), a group of cash-rent tenant farmers
challenged an amended agriculture regulation which permitted landlords to demand
the assignment of the farmers' government benefits as a condition to obtaining leases
to work the land. Id. at 162-63. Previous regulations had prohibited such payments.
Id. at 162 n.2. The Court noted that by assigning the benefits, the farmers had to rely
exclusively on the landlords for the financing of food, clothing and tools as they
lacked cash and credit prior to the harvesting of their crops. Id. at 162-64.
Consequently, the Court determined that the landlords' high prices and interest rates
resulted in economic harm to the farmers. Id.
The amended regulation was promulgated pursuant to the Soil Conservation
and Domestic Allotment Act, 16 U.S.C. § 590h(g) (1976), and was incorporated in part
into the Food and Agriculture Act of 1965, 7 U.S.C. § 1444(d)(13) (1976). The Soil
Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to
prescribe regulations to carry out its provisions. 16 U.S.C. §§ 590d(3), h(g) (1976). The
statutory provisions directly at issue in Barlow involved the assignability of
government benefits by the tenants to the landlords and the authority of the
Secretary to amend regulations interpreting the Act. 397 U.S. at 161-63. However, the
Court found protective intent primarily from other statutory provisions which
required that the Secretary generally protect the interests of tenant farmers. Id. See 7
U.S.C. § 1444d(10) (1976); 16 U.S.C. § 590h(b) (1976).
After reviewing the legislative history of all the provisions, the Barlow Court
concluded: "[T]he tenant farmers are clearly within the zone of interests protected by
the Act." 397 U.S. at 164. See Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action:
An Inadequate Surrogate for Claim for Relief, 83 YALE L.J. 425, 495 & n.332 (1974);
Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669,
1732 & n.310 (1975).
35. See, e.g., United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 686 & n.13 (1973) (economic,
recreational and aesthetic harm are judicially cognizable injuries); Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972) (environmental well-being).
36. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Schlesinger v. Reservists
Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166
(1974).
37. See Alternative Approach, supra note 12, at 222. One year after the Data
Processing decision, the Supreme Court again had the occasion to apply the "zone of
1977-19781
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Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War38 and United States v.
Richardson,39 the Court relied on the nexus test of Flast to deny standing to
plaintiffs who failed to establish a logical connection between their status as
taxpayers and the constitutional provisions at issue. 40 In addition, the Court
adopted the view in both cases that the federal judiciary should exercise
restraint on matters of general public interest as a prudential limitation on
interests" test. In Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971), investment
companies challenged a ruling by the Comptroller of the Currency which allowed
commercial banks to operate investment funds, allegedly in violation of the Glass-
Steagall Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.). 401 U.S. at 619. The Court, relying on Data Processing, concluded that the
plaintiffs competitive interests were within the zone of interests to be protected by the
Act. Id. at 620-21. As Justice Harlan noted in his dissent, however, the objective of
the Glass-Steagall Act was to protect the financial stability of national banks, not to
protect private companies from competitive injury. Id. at 639-41 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
The decision in Investment Co. Inst. led courts and commentators to suggest
that the zone test was a flexible standard which should be liberally applied. Albert,
supra note 34, at 471; Sedler, Standing, Justiciability, and All That: A Behavioral
Analysis, 25 VAND. L. REV. 479, 486 (1972). See Florida v. Weinberger, 492 F.2d 488
(5th Cir. 1974); William F. Wilke, Inc. v. Department of the Army of the United States,
485 F.2d 180 (4th Cir. 1973); Merriam v. Kunzig, 476 F.2d 1233 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 911 (1973); Park View Heights Corp. v. City of Black Jack, 467 F.2d 1208 (8th
Cir. 1972). See also note 87 infra.
Between the Data Processing and Investment Co. Inst. decisions, the Supreme
Court had yet another opportunity to apply the "zone of interests" test. In Arnold
Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 400 U.S. 45 (1970), private travel agents challenged a ruling by
the Comptroller of the Currency, issued pursuant to the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C.§ 24 (1976), which authorized national banks to provide travel services to their
customers. 400 U.S. at 45. Relying again on § 4 of the Bank Service Corporation Act,
12 U.S.C. § 1864 (1976), to establish the necessary scope of protection for their
competitive interests, the plaintiffs were found to have standing to litigate their
claims. 400 U.S. at 46. See note 34 supra.
38. 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
39. 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
40. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 228 (1974);
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 175 (1974). In Schlesinger, plaintiffs
claiming standing as reservists, citizens, and taxpayers sought to enjoin the Secretary
of Defense from permitting members of Congress to retain their reserve officer
commissions. 418 U.S. at 211. The plaintiffs alleged that the dual responsibilities
exposed the congressmen to possible conflicts of interest and undue influences from
the executive branch, and violated the incompatibility clause of the Constitution. Id.
This clause provides: "[N]o Person holding any Office under the United States, shall
be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6,
cl. 2.
The Court dismissed -claims by the plaintiffs based on their status as citizens
by determining that the only interest and injury asserted was a generalized grievance
common to the public. 418 U.S. at 218-22. Therefore, the Court stated that the
plaintiffs had failed to establish the minimum constitutional requirement of concrete
injury. Id. See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
The Court then addressed the claim of taxpayer standing and held that the
plaintiffs had failed to satisfy the "nexus test" of Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
418 U.S. at 228. See note 19 supra. The Court stated that by not challenging an
expenditure authorized by a statute enacted pursuant to under the the taxing and
spending clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, the plaintiffs had failed to establish a logical
connection between their status as taxpayers and the asserted claim. 418 U.S. at 228.
The district court, applying the zone test of Data Processing, had granted
standing to the plaintiffs based on their status as citizens. Reservists Comm. to Stop
[VOL. 23
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standing. 4' In Warth v. Seldin,42 the Supreme Court denied standing to each
of several categories of plaintiffs who challenged the constitutionality of a
local zoning ordinance which would have had an allegedly exclusionary
impact on low income groups. 43 The Warth Court determined that the
plaintiffs did not suffer a concrete injury and, therefore, lacked the
necessary personal stake in the outcome of the controversy to invoke federal
jurisdiction.44 This decision by the Supreme Court has prompted much
the War v. Laird, 323 F. Supp. 833, 840 (D.D.C. 1971), rev'd, Schlesinger v. Reservists
Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1971). The Supreme Court rejected this analysis,
and noted that Data Processing applied to suits brought under the Administrative
Procedure Act. 418 U.S. at 227 & n.16.
In Richardson, standing was denied to plaintiffs who asserted their status as
citizens and taxpayers to challenge the constitutionality of the Central Intelligence
Act of 1949, 50 U.S.C. §§ 403a-i (1970). United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 168
(1974). To preserve the secrecy of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) budget, the
Act permitted certain interagency transfers of funds and authorized the CIA to
account for expenditures "solely on the certificate of the Director." 50 U.S.C. § 403j(b)
(1970); 418 U.S. at 169. The plaintiffs alleged that the Act violated the statements and
accounts clause of the Constitution, which provides: "[A) regular Statement and
Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from
time to time." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. 418 U.S. at 167-68. Relying again on Flast
v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), the Court held that a taxpayer will have standing only
when he challenges an expenditure authorized by a statute enacted pursuant to the
taxing and spending clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, and only if a specific
constitutional limitation on this taxing and spending power is allegedly violated. 418
U.S. at 175. Since the plaintiffs challenged statutes regulating the accounting and
reporting practices of the CIA, not specific constitutional limitations on the taxing
and spending power of Congress, the Court held that the Flast "nexus test" was not
satisfied. Id. In addition, the Court noted that the plaintiffs were asserting a
"generalized grievance against governmental conduct," rather than a particular
concrete injury. Id. at 175-77.
In a concurring opinion in Richardson, Justice Powell observed: "Relaxation
of standing requirements is directly related to the expansion of judicial power. It
seems to me inescapable that allowing unrestricted taxpayer or citizen standing
would significantly alter the allocation of power at the national level, with a shift
away from a democratic form of government." Id. at 188 (Powell, J., concurring)
(footnote omitted).
41. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227 (1974);
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974).
42. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
43. Id. at 493. The plaintiffs were low and moderate income persons who were
unable to find housing in the area, taxpayers from an adjacent municipality whose
taxes allegedly increased as a result of the exclusionary zoning practices of the town,
and associations of homebuilders, residents, and low income groups who were
allegedly injured economically and culturally by the zoning practices. Id. at 493-97.
The concern for the dangers of general supervisory control over federal, state
and local lawmakers by the courts and the balance of power preserved by the law of
standing was continued in Warth. Justice Powell, writing for the Court, concluded
that without prudential limitations on standing, "the courts would be called upon to
decide abstract questions of wide public significance even though other governmental
institutions may be more competent to address the questions and even though judicial
intervention may be unnecessary to protect individual rights." 422 U.S. at 500
(citations omitted).
44. 422 U.S. at 518. For a recent Supreme Court decision on standing, see Simon
v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 44 (1976). In Eastern Ky., the Court
held that the asserted injury to the plaintiff must be one that was "caused" by agency
action and is "likely to be redressed by a favorable decision." Id. at 38-39.
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criticism among commentators 45 and has further confused the nebulous
concept of standing.
4 6
It was against this historical framework that the D.C. Circuit began its
analysis of the standing claims of Field and TAA. The court adopted the
reasoning of the district court 47 which determined that the plaintiffs had not
suffered a judicially cognizable injury in their capacity as federal
taxpayers.4 8 Since the plaintiffs had failed to satisfy this basic constitu-
tional requirement of injury in fact, the D.C. Circuit summarily dismissed
the standing claims of Field and TAA that were based on their status as
taxpayers.
49
Turning to Mr. Field's standing claim based on his interests as an
independent domestic oil producer, the court stated that he had suffered
economic injury in his capacity as a competitor.5 The majority noted that
45. See Federal Standing, supra note 12, at 397. See generally Note, 29 STAN. L.
REv. 323 (1977).
46. Justice Frankfurter has called the doctrine of standing a "complicated
specialty of federal jurisdiction." United States ex rel. Chapman v. Federal Power
Comm'n, 345 U.S. 153, 156 (1953). In 1970, one court observed:
Standing has been called one of the most amorphous concepts in the entire
domain of the public law ....
The law of standing as developed by the Supreme Court has become an area
of incredible complexity. Much that the Court has written appears to have been
designed to supply retrospective satisfaction rather than future guidance.
Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 861 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
47. Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Simon, 390 F. Supp. 927, 932-38 (D.D.C. 1975).
The plaintiffs contended that standing was satisfied so long as a clear causal
relationship was alleged between the- challenged rulings and their injuries hs
taxpayers. Id. at 932. The district court rejected this argument and held that the
injury suffered by the plaintiffs was a general, undifferentiated injury incurred by all
taxpayers. Id. at 936. The lower court then concluded that the plaintiffs failed as
taxpayers to satisfy the nexus test of Flast. Id. at 937. Specifically, the court noted
that the plaintiffs did not challenge a congressional statute enacted pursuant to the
taxing and spending clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, but alleged an injury caused by
administrative rulings of the executive branch. 390 F. Supp. at 937. In addition, there
was no allegation that the illegal action was in derogation of a specific constitutional
limitation on Congress' taxing and spending power. Id. at 935.
The district court rejected the plaintiffs' claims of taxpayer standing based on
§ 10 of the APA, Pub. L. No. 89-554, ch. 7, § 702, 80 Stat. 378 (1966) (current version at
5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976)) (see note 5 supta), by noting that this section had never been
construed to be an exception to the Flast doctrine. 390 F. Supp. at 937. The court
stated that the APA did not confer standing on a party who had no basis for
bringing a suit other than his status as a federal taxpayer. Id. Even if the APA did
apply, the district court concluded that the two-pronged test of Data Processing was
not met. Id. First, no injury in fact was alleged since the harm suffered by the
plaintiffs was a generalized grievance common to all members of the taxpaying
public. Id. Second, the "zone of interests" test was not satisfied since the plaintiffs
had failed to demonstrate a statutory provision of the Code which provided support
for their standing as taxpayers. Id. The district court noted that the plaintiffs could
not rely on the fundamental policy of the Code - equity in matters of federal taxation
- to evince a congressional intent to protect their interests as taxpayers. Id.
48. 566 F.2d at 134 & n.10.
49. Id. Under Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975), a court must accept as true all
material allegations of the complaint when ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of
standing. Id. at 501. Therefore, the D.C. Circuit assumed that the IRS had unlawfully
allowed a tax credit for payments to foreign nations by companies engaged in oil
extraction and production abroad. 566 F.2d at 135-36.
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the crucial inquiry was not into the magnitude of the harm, but rather
whether the plaintiff has alleged "a distinct and palpable injury to
himself."'" Since this constitutional requirement was satisfied, the court
examined the plaintiffs claim in light of the "zone of interests" test
formulated in Data Processing52 and concluded that Field lacked standing
as a competitor to challenge the IRS rulings.5 3 The court observed that the
zone test serves no individual purpose, but rather supports the general
policies of the standing doctrine to ensure the complete adversarial
presentation of issues to the court and to limit the role of the courts in a
democratic society.
54
Crucial to the court's denial of standing to Mr. Field was an evaluation
of the particular methods that courts should employ in order to discern
congressional intent to protect the interests of the litigant.55 Judge Wilkey,
writing for the majority, indicated that difficulties with the zone test often
arise during the court's determination of which statutory provisions to
examine for evidence of protective intent, and of the role of legislative
history in the court's analysis.
5 6
The majority stated that the examination of the statute should be
limited to the specific provision which formed the basis for the lawsuit.
57
50. 566 F.2d at 138. The district court held that Field had suffered no injury in
fact as a competitor since the price per barrel for oil produced from his well had
increased significantly in the years prior to this action. 390 F. Supp. at 942. In
addition, Field offered no evidence that the value of his investment had decreased. Id.
51. 566 F.2d at 138, quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975). The
Supreme Court had determined in 1972 that an "identifiable trifle" was a sufficient
injury to satisfy the minimum constitutional requirementg for standing. United States
v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 689 & n.14 (1972).
52. See notes 27-34 and accompanying text supra.
53. 566 F.2d at 143. The majority prefaced its discussion of the "zone of interests"
analysis with an observation that there was doubt in some courts as to the current
validity of this test. Id. at 139, citing Florida v. Weinberger, 492 F.2d 488 (5th Cir.
1974) (zone test ignored); Park View Heights Corp. v. City of Black Jack, 467 F.2d
1208, 1212 n.4 (8th Cir. 1972) (only a showing of "injury in fact" is necessary for
standing); Upper Pecos Ass'n v. Stans, 452 F.2d 1233, 1235 (10th Cir. 1971) (APA
evinces congressional intent to protect citizens from harmful agency action), vacated,
409 U.S. 1021 (1972). Moreover, the court noted that the most common pattern is to
"announce in conclusory terms that the zone standard has or has not been satisfied."
566 F.2d at 139 (citations omitted).
After observing that courts often deal with ambiguous and imprecise
standards, the majority affirmed the applicability of the zone test in challenges to
agency action taken pursuant to statutory authority and stated that it was the
nondiscretionary duty of the federal judiciary to apply limitations imposed by the
Supreme Court in its supervisory capacity. Id. at 137 & n.37, 139 & n.57.
54. 566 F.2d at 139. The court indicated that the zone test was particularly suited
to this second task, since it "allows the court to define those instances when it believes
the exercise of its power at the instigation of a particular party is not congruent with
the mandate of the legislative branch in a particular subject area." Id. See note 40
supra.
55. 566 F.2d at 140.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 140-41. By limiting the examination to the particular provision
allegedly violated, the court observed that this would serve the policy of complete
adverseness in the litigation by "[framing] the substantive issue which a court will
decide if the action proceeds to a determination on the merits." Id. See note 54 and
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The D.C. Circuit rejected the plaintiffs argument that other provisions in
the statute, and even the Code's fundamental goal of equity in matters of
federal taxation,58 may be examined for evidence of the necessary protective
intent.5 9 Since the IRS rulings under challenge in the instant case were
issued pursuant to section 901 of the Code, the majority stated the relevant
inquiry as whether "Congress arguably legislate[d] with respect to
competition in section 901 of the Code so as to protect the competitive
interests of domestic oil producers. °60 Answering in the negative, Judge
Wilkey concluded that the statutory language and judicial interpretation of
section 901 confirmed that the purpose of the tax credit provision was to
prevent double taxation of United States companies operating abroad.61
Therefore, the plaintiffs interest in competitive fairness in matters of
federal taxation was not arguably within the "zone of interests" to be
protected by section 901.62
Turning to an inquiry into the role of legislative history in the
determination of standing, the majority noted that a conventional full-scale
examination of the legislative policies behind a statutory provision posed
particular hazards if employed within an analysis of compliance with the
zone test.63 First, the court observed that a decision on standing may
actually reflect a prejudgment of the merits of the case.6 4 A detailed
examination of the policy underlying the provision may result in an
assessment of the substantive weaknesses of the plaintiffs case and
influence the court's disposition of the standing issue. 5 Second, the majority
stated that the legislative history will often not adequately reflect what
particular interests are meant to be regulated or protected by the statute.
66
Third, the D.C. Circuit remarked that a review of legislative history may
ultimately require affirmative evidence of a congressional intent to protect
the particular interests of the particular litigant, which would detract from
accompanying text supra. In addition, the majority noted that the Code was a
complex statute encompassing a wide variety of economic goals and purposes. 566
F.2d at 141. The court stated that congressional protective or regulatory intent
embodied in one section could not be applied to other statutory provisions without
distorting the underlying policies of the Code. Id.
58. See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4025; H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in [1969]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1645.
59. 566 F.2d at 136, 140-41.
60. Id. at 143.
61. Id., citing Burnet v. Chicago Portrait Co., 285 U.S. 1, 2 (1932); Bank of
America Nat'l T. & S. Ass'n v. United States, 459 F.2d 513, 519 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 949 (1972). The court noted that § 901 extended to any United States company
which incurred foreign income tax liability as a consequence of doing business
abroad. 566 F.2d at 143.
62. 566 F.2d at 143.
63. Id. at 141.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 141-42. It was this possible confusion between the issue of standing and
the merits of the case which led Justice Brennan to conclude that injury in fact should
be the only requirement for standing. Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 169 (1970)
(Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting). See note 30_supra.
66. 566 F.2d at 142.
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the flexibility of the zone standard.67 Therefore, the court determined that
the relevant inquiry should be "whether the complaining party has stated
an interest which is arguable from the face of the statute.168
The court concluded with an explanation that the consequences and
impact of agency action are relevant only in determining whether the
plaintiff has suffered injury in fact.69 The majority stated that while the tax
credit provision may have competitive consequences for the plaintiff, this
"zone of impact" cannot be defined as the equivalent of the "zone of
interests" to be protected by section 901.70 The basis of the court's reasoning
was to avoid reducing the standing analysis to the single inquiry of injury to
the plaintiff.
71
Chief Judge Bazelon, in a common dissent to Tax Analysts and
American Society of Travel Agents, Inc. v. Blumenthal,72 criticized the
majority's novel construction and application of the zone test.73 The dissent
asserted that when the legislative mandate is silent or ambiguous with
respect to the intended scope of protection, Supreme Court decisions require
that congressional intent must be construed to include within the protected
zone those interests upon which the statute has a "readily forseeable
impact. '74
67. Id. The court interpreted the zone test as being a flexible standard. Id. The
plaintiffs interest need only be "arguably" within the zone intended to be protected
by the statute. Id. at 140 n.64 (emphasis in original).
68. Id. at 142. The court stated a caveat to this approach to legislative history. If
clear evidence of a congressional intent to allow or deny plaintiffs interests as a basis
for standing is indicated, a consideration of legislative history would be appropriate.
Id. at 143 n.80.
69. Id. at 144 (emphasis in original).
70. Id..
71. Id. The court in Tax Analysts, following the decision of the Supreme Court in
Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976), did not have to reach
the question of whether a third party may ever challenge IRS treatment of another,
and offered no opinion on the matter.
72. 566 F.2d 145 (D.C. Cir. 1977). In Travel Agents, several individual travel
agents and a representative association challenged the failure of the IRS to assess
and collect taxes from a tax exempt religious organization engaged in arranging
travel programs for its members. Id. at 147. Concluding that the "causation" and
"redressability" inquiries of Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26
(1976), were identifiable aspects of the "injury in fact" test, the court denied standing
to the plaintiffs due to the tenuous connection between the relief sought and the
competitive injury allegedly suffered. 566 F.2d at 148-50 & n.2. For a discussion of
Eastern Ky., see note 44 supra. The majority in Travel Agents rejected the plaintiffs'
contention that Data Processing controlled the standing issue in the litigation, and
rather cryptically noted that Data Processing was "not a tax case." 566 F.2d at 151.
Reconciling the analytical basis employed by each panel of the D.C. Circuit in
Tax Analysts and Travel Agents is difficult. However, in the former case, the zone
test was directly addressed, and the conclusions reached by the court were not limited
to the factual situation presented. 566 F.2d at 141-43. See 566 F.2d at 153, 155
(Bazelon, C.J., dissenting). Therefore, whatever the import of the "not a tax case"
statement in Travel Agents, it is submitted that the treatment afforded the zone test
in Tax Analysts will have a continuing effect on litigants asserting injury to their
interests as competitors.
73. 566 F.2d at 153, 155 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 161,166 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting), citing Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp,
401 U.S. 617 (1971); Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 400 U.S. 45 (1970). For a discussion of
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In response to the majority's position that the zone test advances a
general purpose of the standing doctrine - the properly limited role of the
courts in a democratic society - Chief Judge Bazelon noted that the court
was merely requested to evaluate the propriety of agency action under an
applicable statute.75 The dissent stated that such "routine, accepted and
legitimate exercises of judicial power" did not raise serious separation of
powers problems. 6 Chief Judge Bazelon rejected the majority's position that
legislative intent must be derived from the specific statutory provision at
issue.17 The dissent argued that it was a fundamental rule of statutory
interpretation that laws should be read in their entirety.7 8 Moreover, the
dissent maintained that consideration of the basic policies and goals
underlying an act is necessary for an "informed interpretation of any of its
particular sections. ' 79 In opposition to the majority's conclusion that the
appropriate "zone of interests" should be determined from the face of the
statute, the dissent emphasized that any material contributing to the
accurate discernment of congressional purpose would be appropriate for
consideration by the court." Under this reasoning, Chief Judge Bazelon
these cases, see note 37 supra. Chief Judge Bazelon noted that in neither Arnold Tours
nor Investment Co. Inst. did the applicable provisions of the act at issue or its
legislative history indicate a congressional concern for the competitive interests that
the plaintiffs were asserting. 566 F.2d at 161-62 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting). Yet, in
each case, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs had satisfied the requirements of
the zone test. Id.
75. Id. at 162-63 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 163 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Judge indicated that concern
over the appointed judiciary passing on the actions of elected branches of government
arises primarily in the context of constitutional challenges to government action. Id.
at 162 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting), citing United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166,
188 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War,
418 U.S. 208, 221-23 (1974); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 100 (1968).
77. 566 F.2d at 163-64 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 164 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting). Chief Judge Bazelon reasoned that the
legislative intent must be derived from the whole statute, as it is only through this
method of analysis that inconsistencies and contradictions between particular
provisions can be resolved. Id. The dissent noted that this approach was indeed the
technique employed by other courts applying the zone test. Id. (citations omitted). See
note 87 infra. In response to the majority's position that limiting the inquiry to the
particular statutory provision at issue would prevent the "borrowing" of protective
intent from other provisions of the Code, the Chief Judge noted that whether the
policies underlying one statutory provision were relevant to the interpretation of
another could only be answered after both provisions have been examined. 566 F.2d at
165 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
Chief Judge Bazelon was unconvinced that the underlying policy of the
standing doctrine - complete adversariness in the litigation - would be promoted by
focusing on the particular statutory provision forming the basis for the lawsuit. Id. at
164 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting). The dissent contended that a finding of injury in fact
would assure the complete adversarial presentation of the issues to the court. Id.
80. Id. at 165-66 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Judge rejected the
majority's concern that federal judges would be unable to separate the standing
claims from the substantive issues while examining the legislative history for
information relevant to both. Id. Moreover, the dissent asserted that courts regularly
use legislative history to ascertain the intent of Congress with respect to the
applicability of the zone test. Id. at 165 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting), citing Rental
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would have granted standing to plaintiff Field in his capacity as a
competitor.81
The Tax Analysts court confirmed the applicability of the "zone of
interests" test in challenges to agency action taken pursuant to statutory
authority."2 The potential burden on the IRS's administrative processes and
the federal judiciary resulting from third party challenges to the tax
treatment of a competitor cautions against permitting the plaintiff in the
instant case to litigate his claim. However, it is submitted that the general
method of analysis set out by the court for applying the zone test is not
supported by case law,83 and may unduly restrict plaintiffs suffering
concrete injury from invoking federal jurisdiction over their claims.
First, concerning the requirement that courts must examine the specific
statutory provision allegedly violated in order to discern the necessary
protective intent,84 the Supreme Court decisions do not expressly address
this issue. However, in Data Processing, where the zone test was announced,
a congressional purpose to protect the interests of the litigant was found in
statutory provisions other than the one which authorized the challenged
agency action.85 In addition, a review of lower federal court decisions reveals
that it is sufficient that the protective intent be found in the particular
provision forming the basis for the lawsuit, but this has not been determined
to be necessary to establish standing.8 6 The courts often approach this issue
by reviewing the underlying policies of the act, or by relying on any
provision of the enactment which indicates a congressional purpose to
protect the asserted interests.8 7 One commentator has suggested that any
Housing Ass'n of Greater Lynn, Inc. v. Hills, 548 F.2d 388, 390 (1st Cir. 1977); Hayes
Int'l Corp. v. McLucas, 509 F.2d 247, 256 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 864 (1975);
Pesikoff v. Secretary of Labor, 501 F.2d 757, 760 n.2 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1038 (1974); Secretary of Labor v. Farino, 490 F.2d 885, 889 (7th Cir. 1973).
Chief Judge Bazelon suggested that the flexibility of the zone test would be
maintained by the fact that the "arguable" and "zone" language of the legal standard
requires that potential ambiguities in the legislative history be resolved in the
plaintiffs favor. 566 F.2d at 166 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting). The majority's
requirement that the legislative history evidence a clear congressional intent to allow
the plaintiff's interests as a basis for standing undermines this flexibility. Id. See
notes 67 & 68 and accompanying text supra.
81. 566 F.2d at 167 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting).
82. 566 F.2d at 139. See note 53 and accompanying text supra.
83. See note 37 supra; notes 86 & 87 and accompanying text infra.
84. See notes 57-60 and accompanying text supra.
85. Association of Data Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 155-57
(1970). See notes 32-34 and accompanying text supra.
86. See, e.g., Concerned Residents of Buck Hill Falls v. Grant, 537 F.2d 29, 33 (3d
Cir. 1976); Cincinnati Elec. Corp. v. Kleppe, 509 F.2d 1080, 1086 (6th Cir. 1975).
87. See, e.g., Rodeway Inns of America, Inc. v. Frank, 541 F.2d 759 (8th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 430 U.S. 935 (1977) (necessary to examine statute as a whole as well as
specific statutory provisions); Concerned Residents of Buck Hill Falls v. Grant, 537
F.2d 29 (3d Cir. 1976) (look to zone of interests of whole act, not particular provision
purportedly violated); Cincinnati Elec. Corp. v. Kleppe, 509 F.2d 1080 (6th Cir. 1975)
(declared policy of act indicates zone of protected interests); Davis v. Romney, 490
F.2d 1360 (3d Cir. 1974) (statute, not particular provision violated, should be examined
to ascertain whether plaintiffs were aggrieved within meaning of relevant statute);
Harry H. Price & Sons v. Hardin, 425 F.2d 1137 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1009
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statute, even one different from the statute forming the basis of the suit,
which evidences an intent to protect the plaintiffs interests, may be used to
satisfy the zone test.88 By adopting the requirement that the particular
statutory provision should be the focus of analysis when applying the zone
test, it appears the Tax Analysts court has overlooked the methods of
analysis adopted by the other circuits and the Supreme Court.8 9
Second, it is difficult to see how this narrowed application of the zone
test will advance the stated purposes of the standing doctrine.9° The court
concluded that "[i]f the necessary arguable intent is found in the particular
provision, this fact further ensures that the complaining party will have a
strong connection to the controversy and that it will serve the policy of
complete adversariness in the litigation .. "..",91 However, the Supreme
Court itself has observed that important interests have been vindicated by
plaintiffs with no more stake in the outcome of an action than a fraction of a
vote,92 a five dollar fine,93 a $1.50 poll tax,94 or generally any "identifiable
trifle" of harm.95 As indicated by Chief Judge Bazelon, the finding that the
plaintiff suffered an economic injury in his capacity as a competitor will
often be enough in itself to guarantee the personal stake and interest
necessary to impart the concrete adverseness required by article 111.96 It has
been noted that "[p]arties to whom the Court denies standing would often
make abler presentations than parties whose standing the Court upholds." 97
The second purpose of the standing doctrine concerns the allocation of
power at the national level and a fear of judicial supervision of the
coordinate branches of the federal government. 9 The Tax Analysts court
observed that the zone test allows "courts to define those instances when it
believes the exercise of its power at the instigation of a particular party is
not congruent with the mandate of the legislative branch in a particular
(1971) (declared policy of act discloses zone of interests). For the Supreme Court's
treatment of this issue, see notes 34 & 37 supra. See also Hasl, Standing Revisited -
The Aftermath of Data Processing, 18 ST. Louis L.J. 12, 39 (1973). For an application
of the "zone of interests" test in actions not brought under the APA, see Ray Baillie
Trash Hauling, Inc. v. Kleppe, 477 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 914
(1974) (as small business concerns, plaintiffs are within zone of interests of Small
Business Act); National Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Independent Postal Sys. of
America, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 804 (W.D. Okla. 1971), aff'd, 470 F.2d 265 (10th Cir. 1972)
(plaintiff and defendants would be competitors under postal laws). For prior treatment
of this issue by the D.C. Circuit, see Constructores Civiles de Centroamerica, S.A. v.
Hannah, 459 F.2d 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
88. Comment, supra note 30, at 556-57.
89. See notes 34 & 37 supra; notes 86 & 87 and accompanying text supra.
90. See text accompanying note 54 supra.
91. 566 F.2d at 141.
92. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
93. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
94. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
95. United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 689 & n.14 (1973). See note 35 and
accompanying text supra.
96. 566 F.2d at 164 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting).
97. K DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES, § 22.21 at 524 (Supp.
1976).
98. See note 54 and accompanying text supra.
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subject area." 99 It is submitted, however, that since Congress specifically
provided for review of agency action in the APA,1° separation of powers
considerations should not dominate a court's determination of the standing
issue. Rather, it is suggested that the congressional intent to authorize
judicial review should be controlling.'0' If the enactment indicated a clear
congressional purpose to deny protection to the interest that the plaintiff is
asserting, standing should be denied. 10 2 Absent such evidence, however, it
appears that any provision of the enactment allegedly violated which
manifests a purpose to protect or regulate the interests of the plaintiff would
be a "relevant statute" within the meaning of the APA sufficient to confer
standing." 3 This analysis would be consistent with the Supreme Court's
statement on reviewability: "Judicial review of a final agency action will not
be cut off unless there is a persuasive reason to believe that such was the
purpose of Congress."'0 4
99. 566 F.2d at 140.
100. See note 25 supra.
101. See Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 58-60 (1976)
(Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
102. Association of Data Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 156-57
(1970).
103. See, e.g., Concerned Residents of Buck Hill Falls v. Grant, 537 F.2d 29, 33 (3d
Cir. 1976); Cincinnati Elec. Corp. v. Kleppe, 509 F.2d 1080, 1086 (6th Cir. 1975). See
note 87 supra. The view has been expressed by some commentators that it is
inappropriate to consider concern for the expansion of judicial power within the
context of the law of standing. See K. DAvIs, supra note 97, § 22.21 at 521-23. Use of
the law of standing to limit judicial power "distorts the doctrine's analytical basis and
makes it excessively vague and subject to inconsistent and arbitrary application by
the lower courts." Note, 29 STAN. L. REV. 323, 347 (1977). Moreover, the Supreme Court
has stated that standing to sue refers to the posture of the plaintiff and not the legal
interests to be unraveled. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99-100 (1968). As stated by the
Court: "The question whether a particular person is a proper person to maintain the
action does not, by its own force, raise separation of powers problems relating to
improper judicial interference in areas committed to other branches of the Federal
Government." Id. at 100. Other jurisdictional doctrines, such as mootness, ripeness,
agency discretion, advisory opinion and political question, may be more appropriate
protections against an excessive judicial role in government. K. DAVIS, supra note 97,
§ 22.21, at 522. See note 30 supra. Indeed, the district court in Tax Analysts considered
the doctrine of political question in dicta following its disposition of the standing
issue. Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Simon, 390 F. Supp. 927, 942 (D.D.C. 1975).
104. Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 166-67 (1970), quoting Abbott Laboratories v.
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967). The Barlow Court continued: "[J]udicial review of
such administrative action is the rule, and nonreviewability an exception which must
be demonstrated." 397 U.S. at 166. This presumption of reviewability is conclusive
unless review is expressly precluded by statute, or unless "agency action is committed
to agency discretion by law." 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1976).
In Association of Data Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150
(1970), the Court noted that the trend is toward enlargement of the class of people who
may challenge administrative action. Id. at 154. The Court quoted with approval the
legislative history of the Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 89-554, ch. 7,
§§ 701-706, 80 Stat. 378 (1966) (current version 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1976)), which
states: "To preclude judicial review under this bill a statute, if not specific in
withholding such review, must on its face give clear and convincing evidence of an
intent to withhold it." 367 U.S. at 156, quoting H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d
Sess. 41, reprinted in [1946] U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. 1195. See also Davis, supra note
12, at 472; Comment, supra note 30, at 561-63. It is submitted that the narrowing of
the zone of interests test in Tax Analysts may frustrate this express congressional
purpose to provide for judicial review of agency action.
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The Internal Revenue Code is an extraordinarily complex statute which
has as its purpose a wide variety of economic and social goals.10 5 However,
the decision in Tax Analysts is not limited to cases involving the Treasury
Department's administration of the Code. 10 6 Rather, the method of analysis
adopted by the court applies to challenges to agency action in general.
10 7
The overall effect may be to further limit the exercise of federal jurisdiction
over claims asserted by plaintiffs who have suffered concrete injury. The
statutory language of the particular provision upon which the action is
based will often provide little guidance for the interests intended to be
protected, 08 and may be subject to inconsistent interpretations by the
courts. 10 9 In addition, standing decisions reached on policy grounds may be
rationalized by a broad or narrow construction of the statutory language
and legislative history."10 Under the Tax Analysts decision, if the legislative
history is sparse, imprecise, or even contradictory,"' standing will be denied
to a litigant whose interests fall within the general goals of the enactment
unless the specific provision at issue evidences the necessary protective
intent.11
2
By narrowing the zone of interests test, the D.C. Circuit has created a
serious obstacle to federal plaintiffs challenging agency action. The doctrine
of standing serves to limit access to the federal courts to those who have a
sufficient personal stake in the outcome of a controversy so as to assure the
complete adversarial presentation of the issues, yet the tests formulated by
the Tax Analysts court seem unrelated to this goal." 3 Another underlying
rationale for standing - the allocation of power among the branches of
government - involves a consideration of the issues that a court will decide,
not who will litigate them, and treatment of this issue is perhaps more
appropriate under other doctrines of justiciability." 4 Separation of powers
considerations should not control the standing determination when
Congress has expressly provided for judicial review of agency action in the
APA,"5 and the plaintiffs interests fall within the general scope of
protection of a "relevant statute."" 6  Kenneth A. Jacobsen
Professor Davis would go a step further by eliminating the requirement that
the plaintiff make any affirmative showing that the zone test was satisfied. K. DAVIS,
supra note 97, § 22.21 at 515-17. The burden would shift to the agency to demonstrate
that the plaintiff's interests were not to be protected: "A person whose interest is
injured in fact or imminently threatened with injury by governmental action has
standing to challenge that action in absence of legislative intent that the interest is
not to be protected." Id.
105. 566 F.2d at 141.
106. 566 F.2d at 153, 155 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting).
107. Id.; see 566 F.2d at 141-43; note 72 supra.
108. See Comment, supra note 30, at 556-58. See also Jones, Statutory Doubts and
Legislative Intention, 40 COLUM. L. REV. 957, 958 (1940).
109. See Jones, supra note 108, at 961-70.
110. See Comment, supra note 30, at 558.
111. Id.
112. 566 F.2d at 140-43 & n.80.
113. See notes 90-97 and accompanying text supra.
114. See note 103 supra.
115. See note 25 supra.
116. Id. See notes 98-104 and accompanying text supra.
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